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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

19398

JEFFREY McINTYRE ROBERTS,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense
of Theft by Deception, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated §76-6-405(1)

(1953 as amended) in the Fourth

Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah,
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Jeffrey Mcintyre Roberts, was charged by
Information with Theft by Deception, a Second Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-405(1)

(1953 as amended).

Trial was held on the 4th and 6th days of May, 1983.

On the

6th day of May, appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense,
as charged in the Information.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt
entered against him and an order of dismissal, or, in the
alternative, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A substantial portion of the testimony offered at

trial was disputed by the parties.

However, for purposes of

this appeal, and the legal issue involved herein, appellant

will recite, substantially, the facts as testified to by the
State's witnesses.
The State's primary witness was Mr. David Rail.

Rail

testified that in 1978, he was employed as a life insurance
agent in England.

(Transcript Page 41; Record page 176)

While

there, he became acquainted with and sold a life insurance
policy to the alleged victim, Miriam Marlowe, and her husband
(Tr. 41; R. 76).

In 1980, Rail left England and came to Utah

where he continued with his life insurance business (Tr. 42; R.
177).

In July of 1981, Miriam Marlowe's husband died in a

swimming accident (Tr. 42; R. 177).

Rail, pursuant to the

provisions of the policy he had sold them, began processing the
claim with Mrs. Marlowe as the named beneficiary in March of
1982 (Tr. 42; R.

177).

Rail testified that he discussed the availability of
the Marlowe's insurance proceeds with Mr. John Walton sometime
during March of 1982 (Tr. 44; R.

179).

Mr. Walton was a friend

of Rail who had an office in the same business complex as Rail
(Tr. 44; R. 179).

It was during one of these conversations

that appellant was present and overheard the discussion
the availability of the Marlowe money (Tr. 44; R.

179).

A couple of days later, appellant approached Rail.
According to Rail, appellant told him that he had a friend in
the State Department who had access to substantial amounts of
gold located in Brazil (Tr. 45; R.
2

180).

Appellant also told

Rail that this friend could purchase the gold at $100.00 an
ounce in Brazil and turn it over in this country for approximately
$300.00 an ounce (Tr. 45; R. 180).
Based on these representations, Rail persuaded Marlowe
to invest approximately $25,000.oOl of her insurance proceeds
with appellant (Tr. 46; R. 181).

The total amount of proceeds

payable to Marlowe was $38,000.00 (Tr. 46; Record 181).

Appellant,

during this period of time, had no direct contact or conversation
with Marlowe.

In fact, the two saw each other for the first

time at trial (Tr. 108; R. 243).
Because Marlowe was residing in California in 1982
(Tr. 43; R. 178), Rail testified that he flew there in order to
deliver the insurance proceeds to her (Tr. 46; R. 181).

At

that time, he obtained the $25,000.00 from her as well as
$3,000.00 for a personal loan from her to him (Tr. 47; R. 182).
Rail also testified that he later borrowed an additional $5,000.00
from Marlowe (Tr. 47; R. 182).

At the time of trial, he had

re-paid $500.00 of the $8,000.00 loan (Tr. 115; R. 250).
Rail then indicated at trial that Marlowe was to
receive double her investment ($50,000.00) on the gold transaction
and that he and appellant had agreed to split the remaining
$25,000.00 between themselves (Tr. 48-49; R. 183-184).
At some point during the negotiations, Rail and
appellant discussed the possibility of appellant putting up a

1 The exact amount invested towards the gold venture was
$24,861.00.
This is so because Rail and appellant needed
$139.00 to cover the costs of closing, and took it out of
Marlowe's $25,000.00.
See State's Exhibits 1 and 2.
3

piece of real property he owned as security for Marlowe's
investment (Tr. 52; R. 187).

Eventually, appellant conveyed,

by warranty deed, a piece of property he owned, to Marlowe (Tr.
79; R. 214).

However, the property was encumbered by a tax

lien (Tr. 54; R. 189).

Also, appellant had a deed of trust on

the property in the amount of almost $16,000.00, which was in
default, but which all parties were aware of at the time of
closing (Tr. 81; R. 216).

Although the evidence is unclear as

to the total amount of the tax lien on the property, Walton
testified that he thought it was approximately $6,200.00 (Tr.
135; R. 270).
Although this point was never clarified at trial, the
value of the property was somewhere between $38,000.00 to
$50,000.00 according to Rail2 (Tr. 89-90; R. 224-225).

The

parties agreed that the gold was to be delivered within 90 to
120 days, and at that time, upon delivery, the property would
be conveyed back to appellant (Tr. 54; R. 189).
On April 15, 1982, Rail delivered the $25,000.00 to
Empire Title Company and the transaction was completed (Tr.
59; R. 194).
In July of 1982, Rail discovered that the property
appellant had conveyed had been foreclosed on and was the
subject of a Sheriff's sale (Tr. 66; R. 201).

On cross examinau··,

2Mr. Rail testified at trial that he valued the property,
conservatively, at $38,000.00 - $42,000.00 (Tr. 89; R. 224).
However, he admitted later that when he applied for his loan on
the property, he placed a value of $50,000.00 on the property
, ,
(Tr. 90; R. 225).
Appellant's trial exhibit No.
12 is an appra1sai
valuing the property at $45,000.00 and appellant's trial exhibit
No.
19 values the property at $40,000.00.
4

Rail indicated that he personally borrowed $16,000.00 to purchase
the property in order to preserve Marlowe's equity interest
(Tr. 82, 101; R. 217, 236).

However, Rail waited until after

the Sheriff's sale to purchase the property.
Appellant ultimately failed to produce either the
gold or the money as he had represented he would.

At the time

of trial, Marlowe was still the owner of record, since Rail had
not yet recorded his own deed (Tr. 88; R.

223).

Also, Marlowe

had not, at the time of trial, yet received her money (Tr. 108;
R.

24 3).
Thomas Hare, manager of Empire Land-Title Company,

testified that he handled the closing on the transaction between
Rail and appellant (Tr. 138; R.
prepared a warranty deed.

273).

He testified that he

Also, he indicated that both parties

knew of the existence of the trust deed which was in default
(Tr. 40; R. 284).

The State also produced Cheryl Marie Steele,

who was employed by Tracy-Collins Bank (Tr. 154; R. 289).

She

testified that appellant deposited a cashier's check with her
bank in the amount of $25,000.00 on April 16, 1982 (Tr. 156; R.
2 91 ) •

John Trimpin was called by appellant's counsel as a
defense witness.

Appellant had earlier testified that Trimpin

was his "gold connection" (Tr. 200; R. 335).

However, Trimpin

testified that, although appellant gave him $25,000.00, it was
not for the purchase of gold (Tr. 265; R. 400).

Instead, it

was invested in a movie project that Trimpin was involved with
in Salt Lake City (Tr. 265; R. 400).
5

In addition, Trimpin

testified that he repaid this money to appellant in April of
1983 (Tr. 266; R. 401).
At the end of the State's case, counsel for appellant
made a motion to dismiss the Information based on the
of the evidence as to one of the elements of Theft by Deception
(Tr. 174; R. 309).

The Court denied this motion (Tr.

174; R.

310).

At the close of the evidence, counsel for appellant
requested his proposed Jury Instruction No.

2 be given which

provided:
[T]he crime of theft by deception is not
established in the absence of evidence
showing or tending to show, that the claimed
victim has sustained a pecuniary loss by
reason of the transaction involved. (Record
page 56)
The court refused to give this proposed instruction and counsel
for appellant took his exception for the record (Tr.

328; R.

463).
Finally, counsel for appellant requested the court to
give his proposed Jury Instruction No.
to do.

5, which the court refused

That Instruction provided:
Theft by deception does not occur, and you
must return a verdict of not guilty, when
there is only falsity as to matters having
no pecuniary significance. (R. 59).

Counsel for appellant took his exception to the court's refusal
to give this proposed instruction also (Tr. 328; R. 463).

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE CRIME OF
THEFT BY DECEPTION
This court has consistently held that when sufficiency
of the evidence is questioned on appeal it will review the
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict.
P.2d

State v. Rebeterano,

(April 30, 1984); State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (1983);

state v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (1983); State v. Kerekes, 622
P.2d 1161 (1980).

This court, with that principle in mind, has

further held that a jury conviction will be reversed only when the
evidence:
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
State v. Petree, supra at
444.
Accord, eg., State v. Kerekes, supra,
at 1168.
§76-6-405(1) provides that:
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another
by deception and with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
This statute was preceded by an earlier statute entitled "False

7

Pretenses.•3

This court has held that one of the elements

necessary for conviction under the earlier statute is also
required in order to obtain a conviction under the present §766-405(1).

State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48; 506 (1983).
Thus, before an accused can be convicted of theft by

deception, the state must, in addition to the other elements,
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
an actual fraud must have to be perpetrated
in the sense that something of value was
obtained and the victim lost something of
value.
State v. Vatsis, 351 P. 2d 96 ( 1960).
See also, State v. Walton, Utah, 646 P.2d
689 (1982); State v. Morris, 85 Utah 210,
38 P.2d 1097 (1934); State v. Fisher, 79
Utah 115, 8 P.2d 589 (1932).
In further support for the requirement that the
alleged victim must lose something of value, §76-6-405(2) itself
provides that "[t]heft by deception does not occur, however, when
there is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary
significance,
Appellant submits that the rule adopted by this court
is a sound one in that no deception,

regardless of its intent,

3This statute was §76-20-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

I t provided:

"Obtaining money by false pretense.
Every person who knowingly and designedly
by false or fraudulent representations or
pretenses, obtains from any other person
any chosen action, money, goods, wares,
chattels, effects or other valuable thing
with intent to cheat or defraud any person
of the same, if the value of the property
so obtained does not exceed $50, is punishable
as in cases of petit larceny, and when the
property so obtained is of the value of
more than $50, the person so offending is
punishable as in cases of grand larceny.
8

should constitute theft unless someone has in fact lost something
having pecuniary value.

This is the majority view taken by the

courts in this country.4
Recently,

in State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (1983),

this court dealt with the same issue which is present in the
instant case.

In Johnson, Patricia Johnson was employed as a

rest home administrator.

In 1977, her brother-in-law was hired

to do the maintenance work at the home.

The evidence at trial

showed that the brother-in-law also had, at the time, a full-time
job at Sears.

His time cards at the rest home were punched by

another employee on instruction from Patricia Johnson.

The

evidence further indicated that Patricia's husband, William,
was also hired to help do the work but that all paychecks were
issued in the brother-in-law's name only.

Finally, witnesses

testified that Patricia and William deposited each of the checks
in their joint bank accounts and then disbursed one-third of
each check to the brother-in-law.
This court,

in reversing the convictions of Patricia

and William, stated:
[a]lthough the facts of the present case
indicate that the defendants engaged in wrongful
conduct of some sort, they are insufficient
to satisfy an essential element of the
crime of theft by deception, namely, the
loss of something of value.
Id at page 50.
Appellant submits that the instant case parallels Johnson.

It

is clear that appellant failed to produce the expected $75,000.00
4 See People v. McCoy, Michigan, 254 N,W.2d 829 (1977), wherein
the court of appeals quotes 2 Wharton's Criminal Law & Procedure,
as the general rule that pecuniary loss to the victim must
be shown before a conviction can be obtained.
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from the sale of Brazilian gold.

It is equally clear, based on

the testimony of Cheryl Steele and John Trimpin, that appellant
did not even attempt to purchase the gold.
was wrongful.

Thus, his conduct

But, as this court stated in Johnson,

this

wrongful conduct itself is not sufficient to constitute theft
by deception if the alleged victim, Miriam Marlowe, suffered no
pecuniary loss.
The evidence in the instant case has shown that Rail,
while acting as Marlowe's agent in the transaction, was concerned
that her investment be secured.

Thus, when the transaction

took place, appellant conveyed property to Marlowe which had a
value at somewhere between $38,000.00 to $50,000.00 according
to Rail himself.

At the same time, Rail knew of the default

and tax lien, but nevertheless went through with the deal.
Then, when the property was sold at the Sheriff's sale, Rail
bought the property specifically as he says, to protect her
interest.

Therefore, at the time of trial, Marlowe, through

either her warranty deed, or her agent, had a piece of property
worth $38,000.00 to $50,000.00 minus $16,000,00 in encumbrances.
This arguably leaves an equity interest somewhere in the neighborho:
of $25,000.00.

Also, because the evidence was so ambiguous at

trial, this view is actually given in a light most favorable to
the jury's verdict.
Because Rail was purporting to hold the property for
Marlowe, the State failed to prove that she had actually lost
something of value.

The parties obviously agreed to use the

property as security to protect Marlowe from losing her i nves tmenL
10

should appellant not perform, which he did not.

Surely, if

appellant had taken the money and not deeded the property to
Marlowe as security, the State would easily carry its burden
because she would have clearly lost $25,000.00.
However, based on the evidence, as it was introduced
at trial (emphasis added), there is simply no way for anyone to
determine whether she did,

in fact,

lose anything of value.

Applying the standard enunciated in Petree, supra, it is clear
that the evidence on this issue is sufficiently inconclusive
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
as to appellant's guilt.
Although Marlowe did not, of course, receive that
which she had anticipated, a double return on her investment,
this fact also does not sustain a conviction for theft by
deception.

This court has held that:
The mere fact that a party to a transaction
may not have received all he bargained for
does not give rise to civil liability.
For
stronger reasons the crime of obtaining
money by false pretenses is not established
in the absence of evidence showing, or
tending to show, that the claimed victim
has sustained a pecuniary or property loss
by reason of the transaction relied upon.
State v. Morris, 85 Utah 210, 216, 38 P.2d
1097, 1100 (1934).
It is true that Marlowe did not receive her anticipated

profits.

However, it is also apparent that she did, unless her

agent David Rail violated his duty to her, receive a property
with an equity value of approximately $25,000.00 in return for
her investment.

She received exactly what the parties intended

for her to receive should appellant fail to obtain the gold.
11

Because the State has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant has committed the offense of
Theft by Deception, it is respectfully requested that this
court reverse the judgment of the district court and order the
court to dismiss the Information.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE APPELLANT'S
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION REQUIRING PECUNIARY
LOSS TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM AS AN ELEMENT OF
THEFT BY DECEPTION CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Again, appellant's proposed Instruction No.

2 provided:

[T]he crime of theft by deception is not
established in the absence of evidence
showing, or tending to show, that the
claimed victim has sustained a pecuniary or
property loss by reason of the transaction
relied upon.
Regardless of this court's disposition with relation
to Point I of this brief, it is appellant's position that the
district court's refusal to instruct the jury as to the pecuniary
loss element constitutes clear reversible error.

State v.

Laine, (Utah), 618 P.2d 33 (1980) is directly on point.

In

Laine, this court stated that the general rule is:
[a]n accurate instruction upon the basic
elements of the offense charged is essential,
and the failure to so instruct constitutes
reversible error • .!2_. at 35. Accord e.g.,
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (1982);
Dougherty v. State, 471 P.2d 212, 213 (Nev.
1970); State v. Miller, 565 P.2d 228 (Kan.
1977); Thomas v. State, 527 P.2d 528 (Alaska
1974); State v. Puga, 510 P.2d 1075 (N.M.App.
1973); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law 51193.
Based on the rule espoused by Johnson, supra, and the
other cases cited hereinabove, it is clear that the requirement
of showing pecuniary loss is an element of theft by deception.
12

Because the trial court refused to give this instruction to the
Jury, Laine requires that the verdict and judgment be reversed
and a new trial be ordered.
It should be noted that the district court did instruct
the jury as to most of the elements of theft by deception in
the court's Intruction No. 3.
included therein (R. 69).
other instructions.

However, the key element was not

Nor was it included in any of the

As the court stated in Laine, this is not

sufficient:
In holding the instructions here to be
fatally defective, we do not mean to imply
that all of the elements of the charged
crime must necessarily be contained in one
instruction, though the better practice is,
we think, to do so.
So long as the jury is
informed what each element is and that each
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
the instructions taken as a whole may be
adequate even though the essential elements
are found in more than one instruction.
Id. at 635.
The district court also refused to give appellant's
requested Instruction No. 3, which provided:
[t]heft by deception does not occur, and you
must return a verdict of not guilty, when
there is only falsity as to matters having no
pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the
group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation
of wares or worth in communications addressed
to the public or to a class or group.
This instruction is a verbatim quote of §76-6-405(2).
Because the primary issue in this case concerned whether Miriam
Marlowe sustained a pecuniary loss, the court's refusal to give
this instruction also constitutes reversible error.

Not only

does Laine require such a finding, but, Johnson, supra, cited
13

405(2) specifically in its discussion of the pecuniary damage
element.
405(2) is almost identical to appellant's proposed
Instruction No. 2 and both are correct statements of the law on
theft by deception.

Further, they both concern an essential

element of the crime charged here.

Based on that fact and the

holding in Laine, appellant respectfully requests this court to
reverse the district court judgment and order a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that, based on the
errors committed by the trial court in this matter, appellant
is entitled to a reversal and order of dismissal based on the
lack of evidence as to an element of Theft by Deception.

In

the alternative, should this court disagree, appellant
requests this court to reverse and remand this case for a new
trial based on the fact that the jury was not properly instructed
as to the law.
DATED this

'°'

day of July, 1984,
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